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PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES
is generally unsatisfactory,47 but he may only win damages for harm
caused by workmanship unfit for the anticipated use. The defendant will
be held to the standard of normal, safe construction, not to the standard
of perfection.4s
Strict liability based upon implied warranty has not yet been ex-
tended beyond the builder-vendor. The vendor who resells an old house
(and who may be liable under Restatement § 353) stands usually on the
same level as the vendee himself and cannot be analogized to the manu-
facturer. Courts may be hesitant also to impose strict liability upon the
ordinary building contractor, because he is selling his services but not
selling any goods.49
Although the law of builder-vendor's liability is now in a fluid state,
its broad direction is evident. Special protections for the defendant are
being replaced by obligations comparable to those of a supplier of chattel
or of a negligent building contractor. For the individual who is injured
by defective construction, the field of builder-vendor's liability offers new
potential for recovery.
RICHARD F. MITCHELL
Trade Regulations-Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d)-
Promotional Allowances
The Robinson-Patman Act1 has been labeled a "masterpiece of ob-
scurity," "prolix and perplexing," and a "hodgepodge of confusion and
inconsistency."'2 As predicted,3 the Federal Trade Commission and the
" One wag stated, "Today's buyers do not understand that when you buy a
$10,000 house, you just can't expect gold doorknobs." Bearman 573 n.143.
48 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; Wag-
goner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, -, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
" RESTATEMENT 2D § 402A & comment f; cf. Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Cen-
ter, 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). But see Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J.
202, -, 245 A.2d 1, 5 (1968), which refused to deny that strict liability would be
applied to building contractors.
115 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
1 F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 19,
535 & n.4 (1962, Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as RowE]. "In the end, the
political process of pressure, counterpressure and compromise created a cryptic
and sloppy legislative enactment, whose ineptitudes and solecisms opened up more
legal questions than they closed." Id. at 535.
' Representative Celler, during debate of the proposed Act in the House of
Representatives, predicted: "[T]he courts will have the devil's own job to unravel
the tangle. . . . You will have the herculean task to make it yield sense." 80
CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
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courts have had a "herculean task" in attempting to make the Act yield
sense.4 In FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.' the Supreme Court clarified a key
provision of the Act by defining the scope of the term "customer" in
section 2(d).' It is the purpose of this note to examine the history of
the case, to point out the difficulties suppliers will face in complying
with the Court's decision, and to speculate as to the effect of the decision
on other sections of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Fred Meyer, Inc. is the operator of a chain of thirteen supermarkets
in the Portland, Oregon area. One of Meyer's principal sales promotional
activities has been an annual four-week promotional campaign based on
the distribution of coupon books in the Meyer stores. The coupon books
consists of approximately seventy-two pages or coupons with each page
featuring a product which, upon surrender of the appropriate coupon-
page, is sold at a reduced price by the Meyer store. The public can obtain
coupon books for ten cents each and can realize savings of up to one-third
on each featured item. In addition to the nominal sum paid by the public
to obtain the coupon books, Meyer finances the promotional campaign by
charging the suppliers (from whom Meyer buys directly) of each fea-
tured product at least 350 dollars per coupon-page of advertising. More-
over, some of the suppliers contribute further to the financing of the
campaign by replacing at no cost a percentage of the goods sold by
Meyer during the campaign or by redeeming coupons in cash at an
agreed rate.
The FTC found that Meyer's promotional campaign, as conducted
in the years 1956 through 1958, violated section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act because the 350 dollars paid by four of the participating
suppliers for advertising in Meyer's coupon books represented promo-
tional allowances which were not made available on proportionally equal
terms to competing customers of Meyer. 7 However, section 2(d) applies
'See, e.g., RowE at 20.
5390 U.S. 341 (1968).615 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964) provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or
contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through
such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offer-
ing for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available
on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the dis-
tribution of such products or commodities.
'The FTC also found that section 2(a) of the Act was violated in that the
free replacement of goods and coupon redemptions by some of the participating
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only to sellers and in order to charge Meyer with a violation the Com-
mission had to resort to section 5 (a)' of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which makes unfair methods of competition in commerce illegal
and empowers the FTC to prevent the use of such unfair methods of
competition.' The Commission thus found that Meyer had violated sec-
tion 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act by knowingly inducing
its suppliers to grant promotional allowances prohibited by section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 10
In finding a violation of section 2(d), the FTC held that the partici-
pating suppliers, having chosen to grant promotional allowances to Meyer
who bought from them directly, should have made promotional allow-
ances available on proportionally equal terms to those wholesalers who
sell to retailers in competition with the Meyer stores." Meyer argued,
on the other hand, that wholesalers were not entitled to promotional
allowances on proportionally equal terms because they were not "com-
peting" with the Meyer stores within the meaning of section 2(d).
Meyer argued further that retailers buying through wholesalers were
not entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms,
regardless of their competition with the Meyer stores, because they were
not "customers" of the suppliers within the meaning of section 2(d).
Following this line of reasoning, only those retailers who buy directly
from the suppliers and are also in competition with the Meyer stores
are entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms.
The Commission found this conclusion "startling" and in total conflict
with the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act to protect independent
retailers from the "chains' " ability to exact discriminatory concessions
from suppliers.'
suppliers constituted price discrimination prohibited by that section. The Commis-
sion, therefore, found Meyer to be in violation of section 2(f) of the Act which
prohibits any person from knowingly inducing a price discrimination forbidden
by section 2(a). [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,368 at 21,206(FTC 1963). It is beyond the scope of this note to examine the violation of
section 2(a) and thus the violation of section 2(f).
'15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
0 See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), where it was
first held that a buyer's participation in transactions prohibited by section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act is reachable under section 5 (a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
"0 [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,368 at 21,206 (FTC
1963).Id. at 21,216-17.12Id. at 21,214-16. The Commission observed:
Thus, in a geographical market served by, say, two direct-buying "chains,"
and one wholesaler with 100 retailer-customers, a supplier who gave a
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The FTC was still confronted with the contention that those whole-
salers who sold to Meyer's retail competitors were not in fact competing
with Meyer and thus not entitled to promotional allowances on propor-
tionally equal terms. The Commission answered this contention by point-
ing to the language of the statute. "[T] he statute speaks of competition
in the 'distribution' of the products, not merely of competition in their
'resale.' These wholesalers, through their numerous retailer-customers,
are seeking exactly the same consumer dollars that respondents are
after."' 3 The Commission thus believed that the independent retailer
could best be protected by requiring suppliers to make promotional allow-
ances available to wholesalers who would presumably pass them on to
their retailer customers or use them for the benefit of those customers.14
On appeal the court of appeals agreed with Meyer's interpretation
of "customers competing" in section 2(d) and reversed the Commis-
sion." ;
The Supreme Court in granting the Commission's petition for
certiorari limited its review to the question "[w] hether a supplier's grant-
ing to a retailer who buys directly from it promotional allowances that
are not made available to a wholesaler who sells to retailers competing
with the direct buying retailer violates Section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act."' 6 The court agreed with the Commission in holding that
the interpretation of "customers competing" in section 2(d) urged by
Meyer was wholly untenable,' 7 but it concluded that Meyer's retail
competitors, rather than the wholesalers who sell to the retailers,
were competing customers within the meaning of section 2(d) and thus
promotional allowance to Chain A would not be required by Section 2(d)
to give it to either the wholesaler or the 100 independent retailers who
buy from it, but would have to give it to Chain B. This would mean,
of course, that the protection of Section 2(d) is accorded to those who
presumably have the market power to take care of themselves (competing
"chains"), but denied to those who . . . need its protection very badly
indeed.
Id. at 21,214.13Id. at 21,215.
"Id. Commissioner Elman, while agreeing that Meyer's promotional activities
constituted violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, disagreed with respect to
what made the practice illegal. He took the position that the suppliers should
have made promotional allowances available directly to Meyer's retail competitors.
Requiring the allowances to be made available to wholesalers whose customers
compete with Meyer, he reasoned, would in no way insure that Meyer's retail
competitors will receive the protection that the Act intended them to have. Id.
at 21,231-32.
15359 F.2d 351, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1966).
"386 U.S. 907 (1967).
17 390 U.S. at 349.
[Vol. 47
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entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms."8 Start-
ing with the proposition that "the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in
1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained dis-
criminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater pur-
chasing power,"' the Court undertook a review of the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of section 2(d). The Court concluded that
section 2(d) was aimed at a form of indirect price discrimination which
resulted from the "chains" being able to command large promotional
allowances from their suppliers while the small independent competitors
of these "chains" were in no position to command such allowances.
These allowances enabled the "chains" to shift part of their advertising
costs to their suppliers while the smaller competitors could not.20
While recognizing that legislative history is inconclusive with respect
to the meaning of "customer" in section 2(d), the Court found that
its definition of customer "to include retailers who purchase through
wholesalers and compete with direct buyers" was necessary to prevent
anomalous results. "If we were to read 'customer' as excluding re-
tailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers, we
would frustrate the purpose of 2(d). We effectuate it by holding that
the section includes such competing retailers within the protected class."'2'
In rejecting the Commission's findings that wholesalers who sold
to retail competitors of Meyer are competing customers within the mean-
ing of section 2(d), the Court held that the Commission's definition
of competition was too broad. Once again the Court found legislative
history to be inconclusive, but concluded that it does "strongly suggest
that the competition with which Congress was concerned in 2(d) was
that between buyers who competed in resales of the supplier's pro-
ducts."22 Moreover, the Court pointed to section 2(a) of the Robinson-
18 Id. at 352.
"Id. at 349, quoting FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
"0 390 U.S. at 350-51.
,"lId. at 352.
On the one hand, direct-buying retailers like Meyer, who resell large quanti-
ties of their suppliers' products and therefore find it feasible to undertake
the traditional wholesaling functions for themselves, would be protected....
On the other hand, smaller retailers whose only access to suppliers is
through independent wholesalers would not be entitled to this protection.
Such a result would be diametrically opposed to Congress' clearly stated
intent...
Id. 2 Id. at 355-56. "While it cannot be doubted that Congress reasonably could
have employed such a broad concept of competition in § 2(d), we do not believe
that the use of the word 'distribution' rather than 'resake' is a clear jndivatiori
that it did, , , ." Id, at 356,
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Patman Act and its broad definition of competition 23 as evidence that
Congress did not intend competition in section 2(d) to have such a
broad scope. "When Congress wished to expand the meaning of com-
petition to include more than resellers operating on the same functional
level, it knew how to do so in unmistakable terms. 24
As indicated above the Fred Meyer decision answers important ques-
tions concerning section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is well
known that the Robinson-Patman Act grew out of a fear, widespread
during the 1930's, that the independent retailer was about to be swallowed
up by the large "chain" stores.25 An investigation ordered by Congress
revealed that the "chains" by virtue of their greater purchasing power
could exact concessions from their suppliers which the independent re-
tailers could not obtain. 6 Among these concessions were large allow-
ances for advertising and other sales promotional activities.27  The
investigation also revealed that these concessions were wholly beyond
the reach of existing antitrust laws.28 Congress attacked this type of
discrimination by providing in sections 2(d) and 2(e)2 9 of the Robin-
son-Patman Act that any services or facilities3 ° or payment in consider-
2 Section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination that may "injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them."
2'390 U.S. at 356-57.
"See, e.g., ROwE at 3-14. Appearing before the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Patman stated:
I believe it is the opinion of everyone who has studied this subject, that
the day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and
done quickly. He cannot possibly survive. . . . So we have reached the
crossroads; we must either turn the food and grocery business of this
country . . . over to a few corporate chains, or we have got to pass
laws that will give the people, who built this country in time of peace and
saved it in time of war, an opportunity to exist....
Hearings on H.R. 8442, 4495, 5062 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935).
"FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., Ist Sess. 57-65 (1935).
2 Id. at 44-46, 61.
'
8Id. at 63-65.
2915 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one pur-
chaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought
for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or fur-
nishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities
connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such
commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionally equal terms.
,o See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Pay-
ments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5 (1968), for examples of services and
facilities covered by sections 2(d) and 2(e).
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ation of such services or facilities cannot be granted to one customer or
purchaser unless made available to all competing customers or purchasers
on proportionally equal terms.31
Section 2(d) applies to the situation where payments are made to a
customer and the customer himself furnishes the services or facilities in
connection with the distribution of the supplier's products. Section 2 (e)
applies to the situation where services or facilities are furnished directly
to the customer. 2 The application of these two sections is relatively
simple when a supplier is dealing with customers on the same functional
level. However, complex problems arise when a supplier deals with cus-
tomers on different functional levels, such as direct-buying retailers and
wholesalers. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Meyer, the Robinson-
Patman Act was intended to prevent a supplier from granting discrim-
inatory promotional allowances such as those granted to Meyer.33 How-
ever, prior to the Meyer decision the language of section 2(d),
specifically the phrase "customers competing," presented an obstacle to
the FTC and to the courts in barring such allowances when the sup-
plier was dealing with customers on different functional levels.
One device that might have been used to combat the discriminatory
granting of promotional allowances to direct-buying retailers by suppliers
dealing on different functional levels was the "indirect purchaser doc-
trine," whereby a retailer buying the supplier's product through a
wholesaler is nevertheless treated as the supplier's customer.3 4 In
"Although there are several semantic disparities in sections 2(d) and 2(e),
the courts have generally interpreted the two sections as being two sides of the
same coin. See, e.g., Exquisite Form Bra., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
" See ROWE at 373-76 for examples of typical arrangements subject to sections
2(d) and 2(e).
390 U.S. at 352.
" For a discussion of the doctrine see RowE at 57-59, 398-99. Formulated by
the FTC, the indirect purchaser doctrine "treats as the supplier's own customers,
in contemplation of the law, the accounts of his [the supplier's] distributors
whose autonomy he has supplanted by his own activities." Id. at 57. But see Klein
v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956), where the validity of the
doctrine has been questioned, at least with respect to treble-damage actions. The
doctrine has evidently not been used in the situation where a supplier, dealing
on different functional levels, grants discriminatory promotional allowances to
a direct-buying retailer. However, its applicability in such a situation was recog-
nized in Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1964).
The indirect purchaser doctrine has normally been used in connection with section
2(d) when a supplier, whose products are distributed exclusively by wholesalers,
grants promotional allowances to certain of its indirect-buying retailers while
not making such allowances available to the indirect-buying competitors of the
favored retailers. If the doctrine is applicable, then all indirect-buying retailers
1968]
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order for this doctrine to be applicable there must be some kind of
direct-dealing between the supplier and the indirect purchaser.8 In the
Meyer case, for example, the court of appeals found no evidence of
direct-dealing between the suppliers participating in Meyer's promotional
scheme and those of Meyer's competitors who bought the suppliers'
products through wholesalers. Finding the "indirect purchaser doctrine"
inapplicable, the court held there was no violation of section 2(d)."°
Another device available to the Commission was to include in appropriate
cease and desist orders a ban on the granting of discriminatory pro-
motional allowances to direct-buying retailers by suppliers dealing on
different functional levels.37 When confronted with a case in which dis-
criminatory promotional allowances were granted to a direct-buying retail-
er, the FTC wavered as to the proper application of section 2(d). In the
Atalanta Trading Corp. case,.8 the Commission held that promotional
payments to a direct-buying retail "chain" did not require that similar pay-
ments be made available to wholesalers whose retail customers competed
with the "chain." In the later Liggett & Myers decision, 9 the FTC was
divided on the question. Although a majority of the Commission re-
fused to decide the issue because they felt there was insufficient evidence
to raise it,4" the dissenting opinion, following the reasoning of a district
are "customers" within the meaning of section 2(d) and thus entitled to the
protection of that section. See American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109
(2d Cir. 1962). The Fred Meyer decision would seem to obviate the need to
resort to the doctrine in this situaion.
" E.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). The
doctrine was invoked where the supplier controlled retail prices and negotiated
directly with the indirect-buying retailers.
359 F.2d at 362-63.
'*See FTC v. Elizabeth Arden, 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947), a case involving section 2(e),
where the FTC issued a cease and desist order directing Arden to restrain from
discriminating among competing purchasers of its product by furnishing cosmetic
demonstrators "to any retailer purchasing their products when such services are
not accorded on proportionally equal terms to . . . other retail purchasers who
in fact resell such products in competition with retailers who receive such ser-
vices." 39 F.T.C. at 305. Some commentators interpreted the Elizabeth Ardcs
decision as meaning that "purchaser" in section 2(e) includes not only those
purchasers buying directly from the supplier but also those purchasers who buy
the supplier's products through independent wholesalers. This view was adopted
by Commissioner Elman in his Fred Meyer dissenting opinion. [1961-1963 Trans-
fer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,368 at 21,231 (FTC 1963). Other com-
mentators and courts interpreted the decision as merely a recognition by the
court of the "indirect purchaser doctrine" since Arden was dealing directly with
the retailers involved.
- 53 F.T.C. 565, 566, 573 (1956) (by implication).
- 56 F.T.C. 215 (1959).
,
0 Id. at 250-52.
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court decision,4 stated that where promotional payments are made to a
direct-buying retail "chain," comparable payments must be made available
to wholesalers whose customers compete with the direct-buying "chain.Y
42
The Liggett & Myers dissenting opinion became the view of the Com-
mission in Fred Meyer.
Numerous difficulties confront the supplier in complying with the
dictates of the Meyer decision. If a supplier desires to undertake the
financing of a retailer-oriented promotional plan, he has the responsi-
bility of making the plan available to all competing customers, both
direct-buying and indirect-buying (buying through wholesalers) cus-
tomers, on proportionally equal terms. This responsibility involves a
duty to inform all competing customers of the existence of the plan,
its terms, and the availability of any alternative plans.13 Informing
those retailers to whom he sells directly presents no problem to the
supplier. However, informing those retailers who buy through whole-
salers presents a formidable problem. The supplier may be able to utilize
his wholesalers to inform the indirect-buying retailers. However, the
Court in Fred Meyer made it clear that the responsibility remains on the
supplier to see that all competing customers are informed of the avail-
ability of the plan.4 Thus the supplier may be unable to utilize his
wholesalers to discharge his duty to inform because he knows them to be
unreliable. The supplier himself might undertake to inform the indirect-
buying retailers of the availability of the plan, but such an undertaking
would also require reliable, cooperative wholesalers to identify those
retailers who buy the supplier's products. If the supplier is unable to
obtain the co-operation of his wholesalers, then he must inform the in-
direct-buying retailers by some other means. The FTC's Proposed
Guides suggest that the supplier might publicize his promotional plan in
trade publications or in advertising brochures. 45 However, the supplier
cannot be certain that all retailers entitled to be informed of the plan
will have access to such publications and brochures. Another suggested
"Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.N.J.
1956).
,2 56 F.T.C. at 253-57.
" See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 1962);
FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments
and Services, 16 C.F.R. 240.8 (1968); proposed amendments to FTC Guides for
Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 33
Fed. Reg. 10615, 10617-18 (1968).
"390 U.S. at 358.
See proposed amendments to FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and
Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 33 Fed. Reg. 10615, 10618 (1968).
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means of informing indirect-buying retailers of the availability of a
promotional plan is to print the offer on shipping containers or to pack
"fliers" describing the plan in the containers,4 and this appears to be
the best means for the supplier to be assured that its duty to inform
has been discharged. 47
Another problem confronting the supplier is the task of formulating
a flexible promotional plan so that all competing customers can partici-
pate. A plan designed to suit the needs and capabilities of certain re-
tailers may be unsuitable to the needs and capabilities of others. Provid-
ing a flexible plan in which all competing customers can participate has
always been a requirement of section 2(d) 4s but the task now involves
a greater burden since the competing customers entitled to participate
under Fred Meyer are likely to be more multifarious than before-from
the nation-wide "chain" store to the neighborhood grocery store, from
the large discount department store to the small town novelty store.
The Meyer decision also complicates the supplier's obligation under
section 2(d) to make promotional payments in consideration for services
or facilities available on proportionally equal terms. This requirement
that payments be made on proportionally equal terms is often satisfied
by proportioning payments according to the number of units of sup-
plier's products purchased by each customer over a certain period of time
or according to the dollar volume representing each customer's purchases.
Therefore, in order to use the number of units sold or dollar volume
as a basis for proportioning payments among indirect-buying retail-
ers, the supplier must have access to his wholesalers' records. Thus,
once again the supplier is placed at the mercy of his wholesalers. 40
In light of these difficult problems, the supplier may desire to turn
over a large portion of the administration of his retail-oriented pro-
motional plans to his wholesalers and compensate them to administer
the plan with respect to the indirect-buying retailers entitled to partici-
pate.5" Once again, the supplier remains ultimately responsible for
I8 1d.
However, many suppliers believe that informing indirect-buying retailers of
the availability of promotional plans by these means is impractical. Most pro-
motional plans are short term, and since the supplier has no way of controlling
the distribution of the cases containing information of the plan, retailers will
be receiving the cases long before the promotion and long after the promotion.
4 See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising
Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1968).
'
9 See BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 357 at B-3 (May 14, 1968).
The Court specifically stated in Fred Meyer that a supplier may utilize its
[Vol. 47
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seeing that the plan is properly administered and "[s]ome manu-
facturers consider their independent wholesalers much too apathetic about
retailer-advertising assistance to be counted on for a vital role in admin-
istration of a cooperative-advertising program."" With so many prob-
lems confronting him in complying with the Fred Meyer decision, the
supplier may choose to discontinue entirely retailer-oriented promotional
activities and to concentrate, instead, on conducting such activities ex-
clusively on a regional or nation-wide basis.
While the Supreme Court's Fred Meyer decision deals only with sec-
tion 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the repercussions of the decision
may very well affect other sections of the Act. The decision's most
direct effect will be on section 2(e) where the term "purchaser" will
almost certainly be interpreted coextensively with the Court's interpreta-
tion of "customer" in section 2(d) .52
Another more far-reaching consequence of the Meyer decision may
be its effect on section 2(a) 53 of the Robinson-Patman Act. In cases
involving the Act there is a great deal of language indicating that the
terms "customer" and "purchaser" in sections 2(a), (d), and (e) should
be interpreted to have the same meaning.54 Thus, it is arguable that
"purchaser" in section 2(a) should now be interpreted to include not
only those purchasers who buy directly from the supplier but also those
purchasers who obtain the supplier's products from a direct-buying pur-
chaser. If this interpretation is accepted, then the scope of section 2(a)
wholesalers "to distribute payments or administer a promotional program." 390
U.S. at 358.
" BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 357 at B-3 (May 14, 1968).
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Fred Meyer, states that "the
supplier could deal through his wholesalers, imposing restrictions on them to
guarantee that an 'allowance' is actually passed through to retailers, only by
running afoul of the Sherman Act." 390 U.S. at 361.
"
2See proposed amendments to FTC Guides for Advertising and Other Mer-
chandising Payments and Services, 33 Fed. Reg. 10615, 10616 (1968); note 31
supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . ..
where the effect of such discrimination may be . . . to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them....
"E.g., "The term 'customer' in § 2(d) should be given the same meaning as
'purchaser' in § 2(a) and (e) in order to harmonize parallel sections of a
statute aimed at a common purpose." American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104,
109 (2d Cir. 1962).
1968]
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is greatly expanded. For example, in one typical situation the supplier
sells both to wholesalers who in turn sell to retailers and to direct-buying
retailers. Employing a functional discount schedule, the supplier charges
the same price to both his wholesalers and his direct-buying retailer
customers. The result of this distribution system is that the direct-buying
retailer is able to sell the supplier's products at lower prices than his
retail competitor who buys the supplier's products through wholesalers,
resulting in competitive injury within the meaning of section 2(a).
However, it has been held that there is no violation of section 2(a)
because there is but one price and that price is paid by all purchasers.
Thus, there is no discrimination in price between different purchasers-
those purchasers being the wholesaler and the direct-buying retailer.'
But if retailers buying through wholesalers are "customers" for the
purpose of section 2(d), it can be argued that they are "purchasers"
for the purposes of section 2(a). Therefore, in addition to competitive
injury within the meaning of section 2(a), there are two prices, the
price paid by the direct-buying retailer to the supplier and the inevitably
higher price paid by the indirect-buying retailer to the wholesaler, result-
ing in discrimination between different purchasers-those purchasers be-
ing the direct-buying retailer and the indirect-buying retailer. If such an
application of section 2(a) is correct, it seems likely that suppliers will
discontinue their use of functional discounts and will begin to employ
quantity discounts exclusively, effectuating this policy by refusing to sell
in small lots. Under this type of discount schedule it would be possible
for retailers buying through wholesalers to obtain a supplier's products
at lower prices than their retailer competitors who buy directly from the
supplier.
Because it would so greatly expand the scope of section 2(a), the
above application of the Fred Meyer decision may not be accepted. How-
ever, the decision has another potential effect on section 2(a). It is
possible that in complying with the Meyer decision a supplier's collabora-
tion with his wholesalers or indirect-buying retailers to insure that pro-
motional allowances are made available to all competing customers on
proportionally equal terms might reach such a point that under the "in-
direct purchaser doctrine" the indirect-buying retailers would be con-
" Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353-54
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 565-66 (D. Del.
1956); Bird & Son, 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937). Cf. FTC. v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948); Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942, 950-51
(D. Conn. 1966).
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sidered the supplier's own customers. 6 In that case the indirect-buying
retailers would be entitled, under section 2 (a), to purchase the supplier's
products at the same price as their direct-buying retail competitors.
The Fred Meyer result is sound in light of the legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act. It is at least arguable however that the
benefit that will be realized by the small retailer buying suppliers' products
through wholesalers is at most minimal and does not justify the predica-
ment in which suppliers now find themselves. If suppliers decide to con-
tinue retail-oriented promotional plans, the cost of administering such
plans is likely to be substantially increased because of the new require-
ments imposed by the Meyer decision. Furthermore, the suppliers' higher
cost will then be passed on in the form of higher product prices which
will ultimately be borne by the consumer. In addition, a number of
suppliers believe that many small indirect-buying retailers who buy in
one or two case lots will not take advantage of the promotional allow-
ances made available to them, because of the red tape they will encounter
in collecting the small payments to which they are entitled. However,
if small indirect-buying retailers band together and act jointly to collect
the payments to which they are entitled, then the potential benefit to
these retailers may be substantial.
To be extricated from the precarious position in which they now find
themselves, suppliers will have to turn to Congress for relief in the form
of amendments to the Robinson-Patman Act. Realistically, however, it
is doubtful that the Meyer decision will precipitate congressional action.
Therefore, suppliers can only hope that the FTC will issue a definitive
set of guidelines to aid them in complying with the Meyer decision.
No set of guidelines can possibly be expected to cover every situa-
tion and, consequently, an increased reliance on FTC advisory opin-
ions is likely. Further complicating the suppliers' dilemma is the FTC's
relative inactivity recently in the Robinson-Patman area.5 7 "Therefore,
it may be that the most substantial immediate hazard for suppliers who
stray from the narrow path of proportional equality is treble-damage
liability in private civil actions."'5
8
MICHAEL R. ABEL
See note 34 supra.
"'During the period from May 1967 to May 1968 the FTC filed only three
complaints under the Robinson-Patman Act. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REPORT No. 357 at B-4 (May 14, 1968).
G8 Id.
